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We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager 
is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has 
two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a 
large ownership stake for monitoring but a small stake for not interfering with managerial 
incentives. Delegating project choice to the manager can alleviate this conflict if managerial 
private benefits are not too small. The large shareholder retains full ownership of the firm but 
monitoring, and the resulting firing policy, are distorted. Severance pay plays a key role in the 
optimal compensation scheme. Delegation is interpreted as a dual-board structure. 
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The board of directors performs several tasks. The board oversees the hiring
and ￿ring of top executives and in general it has a disciplinary role. At the
same time, it also has an advising role and helps to set the strategy of the ￿rm.
Each role, in turn, is a combination of several tasks. For example Adams, Her-
malin and Weisbach (2008) point out that the assessment of top executives has
two components: monitoring what top management does and determining the
intrinsic ability of top management. The advising role instead involves com-
munication and information transmission between management and directors
in order to select the best strategy.
It is well known that in a multi-task environment, the incentive to induce an
agent to perform one task may con￿ ict with the incentive to perform another
task. A possible solution to incentive con￿ icts is represented by an appropriate
allocation of tasks among the agents. Aghion and Tirole (1997) have shown that
a principal may pro￿tably delegate formal or real authority to an agent in order
to mitigate his own incentive to interfere with the agent￿ s decision because such
interference would reduce the agent￿ s incentives.
In the present paper we study a problem of allocation of control rights over
tasks between the initial owner of a ￿rm and the management. The initial owner
has to perform two tasks: elaborating the strategy of the company (project
selection) and monitoring/￿ring the manager. The incentives required by the two
tasks con￿ ict each other because "too high" a level of monitoring discourages the
manager from exerting e⁄ort to gather information needed for project choice.
We suggest that delegating the elaboration of the company￿ s strategy to the
management may be optimal because it alleviates this incentive con￿ ict. In our
setting, the initial owner decides the optimal ownership structure and hires a
manager to run the ￿rm and to gather information on investment projects. At
the same time the owner decides whether to retain the authority to choose the
investment project or to delegate it to the manager. Owner￿ s and manager￿ s
preferences over projects are divergent because of managerial private bene￿ts.
2The owner also has to monitor the manager to ￿nd out his ability in order to
decide whether to ￿re or retain him. Pro￿ts depend on both tasks and optimality
would require di⁄erent ownership stakes: a large stake is required for monitoring
but a small stake is necessary for not interfering with the proposed strategy. We
show that by delegating authority over project choice and by using an optimal
compensation scheme, the large shareholder is able to retain full ownership of
the ￿rm (high incentive for monitoring) and, at the same time, to encourage
information gathering from the manager.
When project choice is delegated to the manager, full ownership of the ￿rm
is optimally retained by the initial owner but monitoring and the resulting ￿ring
decision are somewhat distorted. Monitoring intensity in fact is highest when
the initial owner retains the authority to select the project. This happens be-
cause monitoring has a twofold e⁄ect. A high monitoring intensity increases the
probability of replacing a low-ability manager, thus increasing pro￿ts. However,
by increasing the ￿ring probability, it also reduces managerial e⁄ort in informa-
tion gathering. As a consequence, the initial owner reduces monitoring in order
to provide the proper incentive to the manager and this e⁄ect is more important
when the manager has the crucial task of elaborating the company￿ s strategy.
Managerial discretion in project selection (i.e., delegation) and monetary
compensation (incentive pay and severance pay) coexist in the optimal contract
and complement each other in providing incentives to the manager. Severance
pay is an important component of the contract because of the con￿ ict between
the ￿ring policy (dependent on monitoring) and the need to provide incentives
to the manager. Severance pay alleviates this con￿ ict by (partly) insulating
the manager from the negative consequences of being ￿red without entrenching
him. A noteworthy feature of the optimal contract is that, under delegation,
severance pay is higher than incentive pay. In other words, when ￿red a (low-
ability) manager receives a higher payment than when he is con￿rmed because
he must be compensated for the loss of private bene￿ts. Delegation in fact
allows the manager to choose his preferred project and hence to enjoy private
bene￿ts when he is retained by the ￿rm.
3We interpret the delegation of authority over elaborating the company￿ s
strategy as the choice of a dual-board structure where the management board (in
charge of project selection), is separated from the supervisory board controlled
by the large shareholder (in charge of monitoring and ￿ring/retention decision).
Contrary to what happens in public companies with dispersed ownership, in
companies with concentrated ownership there often is an ￿ excessive￿involvement
of owners in the management of the ￿rm rather than lack of monitoring. Owner￿ s
activism is common in Continental Europe and more generally in countries
with concentrated ownership (see, e.g. Faccio and Lang, 2002). Indeed, recent
empirical studies on corporate governance have suggested that the presence
of an active large shareholder is much more common than previously thought
(see, among others, La Porta et al., 1999, and Holderness, 2009). The policy
implication of our model is that a dual-board structure can be a useful device to
alleviate the problem of excessive interference by the large shareholder without
reducing the fraction of retained shares.
Our framework is similar to that of Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997)
who show that a large shareholder actively involved in a ￿rm￿ s management
may reduce managerial discretion and prevent the manager from appropriating
private bene￿ts. However, large shareholder activism interferes with the need to
motivate the manager to take initiative and make uncontractible investments.
The authors suggest that the ownership structure can be used to solve this
con￿ ict: a reduction in the large shareholder￿ s stake can limit her incentive to
exercise control rights. In their model the large shareholder has only one task
(interfering with project choice)1. Then, one instrument (the ownership struc-
ture) is su¢ cient to alleviate the incentive con￿ ict. In our model instead, the
large shareholder has two tasks (interfering with project choice and monitoring
the manager). As a consequence, more instruments must be used to provide
1Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, call ￿ monitoring￿such activity of project choice supervision,
because in their model there is no role for managerial quality. In our model, on the contrary,
we have both a problem of opposite preferences over projects and a problem of discovering
the unknown ability of the CEO. Thus, in line with previous models of board behavior (see
for example Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1998)) we use the word
monitoring to indicate the activity of the large shareholder aimed at discovering the ability of
the manager in order to decide whether to retain or to ￿re him. See also Tirole (2001).
4proper incentives. Furthermore, we show that using a plurality of instruments
allows the initial owner to retain full ownership of the ￿rm. Indeed, if incentive
compensation cannot be used for some reason, delegation requires the initial
owner to sell a positive fraction of shares, as shown in extension A.
Our paper is also related to the scant literature on multitasking in boards.
Most of the fast-growing literature on boards has analyzed various aspects of
a single task, trying to assess if the board accomplishes it e⁄ectively. For ex-
ample, several papers study optimal board composition from the shareholders￿
point of view (see Harris and Raviv 2008, Raheja 2005, Warther 1998 among
others). Other papers instead examine the determinants of CEO and directors
appointment (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998 and 2003, Hermalin 2005). In gen-
eral, little attention has been paid to tasks interaction. The few exceptions we
are aware of are Adams and Ferreira (2008), Dominguez-Martinez, Swank and
Visser (2008) and Graziano and Luporini (2003). Adams and Ferreira study
the trade-o⁄ between the advisory and the decision making roles of the board.
They show that these two functions may con￿ ict: the CEO may refrain from
sharing his information with the board because he fears that this information
may be used to interfere in decision making. Thus, it may be desirable to sep-
arate these functions in two di⁄erent boards. Dominguez-Martinez, Swank and
Visser consider the twin tasks of disciplining and screening the CEO and they
show that a tension between these two functions arises when the CEO cares
about bene￿ts from holding o¢ ce. They examine the trade-o⁄between discour-
aging executives from becoming too active (empire building) and maximizing
the probability that the executive is competent. As a result the link between
bad performance and dismissal is weakened. Graziano and Luporini focus on
the same con￿ ict between CEO selection and CEO dismissal in a setting where
the dismissal/retention decision provides information both on the quality of the
CEO and on the ability of the board. Since ￿ring the CEO indicates that his
selection was wrong in the ￿rst place, the board may try to hide its inability in
the selection of the CEO by distorting the second task (CEO retention/dismissal
decision).
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
model. Section 3 anticipates some basic features of managerial compensation
and delegation. The choice of monitoring intensity by the large shareholder
is analyzed in Section 4, while Section 5 illustrates the choice of e⁄ort by the
manager. Section 6 examines the choice of the optimal contract and of the
ownership structure by the large shareholder. Section 7 presents three extensions
of the basic model and ￿nally Section 8 discusses the results and illustrates how
delegation can be interpreted in terms of a dual board structure.
2 The model
Consider a ￿rm initially owned by a single owner (she) who needs to hire a
manager (he) of unknown ability. The manager is needed both to run routine
activities and to collect information on prospective new projects. Depending on
the delegation structure, such information can be used either by the owner or
by the manager himself to select a project. Project choice cannot be veri￿ed by
third parties; thus the owner cannot contract directly on such choice. There are
two types of manager: high-ability (H) and low-ability (L). The ability of the
manager depends on the quality of the matching between his skills and the skills
required by that particular ￿rm. As a consequence, the manager himself is not
aware of his type when joining the ￿rm, and no screening is possible. Only after
the manager has spent some time on the job, can the owner assess his ability
through monitoring and decide whether to ￿re or retain him. Both the owner
and the manager are risk-neutral. The latter has a reservation level of utility
equal to zero, has no wealth and is protected by limited liability.
Our model develops over four periods. In period 1, the owner decides the
fraction ￿ of shares she wants to retain, (1 ￿ ￿ > 0) and makes a take-it-or-
leave-it contract o⁄er to a manager, randomly selected from a given pool where
the fraction of high-ability managers is ￿; with 0 < ￿ < 1. The remaining shares,
if any, are sold to dispersed shareholders who do not play any active role in ￿rm





o⁄ered to the manager speci￿es the delegation
structure d; the compensation w; the severance pay s; and the ￿ring rule PF(b t)
where b t = b H; b L; is the manager type reported by the large shareholder: d 2
f0;1g where d = 0 indicates that the large shareholder retains the authority
to choose the investment project and d = 1 indicates that project choice is
delegated to the manager.2 For simplicity, the ￿ring rule is expressed in terms
of the ￿ring probability PF(b t) because, as it will be shown later, the optimal
values of PF(b t) are either 0 or 1: Given that the ￿ring/retention decision is
observable and veri￿able, it can be part of the contract.
In period 2, the manager can exert e⁄ort in order to obtain information about
projects, and, based on such information, the ￿rm (either the large shareholder
or the manager himself, depending on the chosen value of d) may decide to
undertake a risky project in addition to ￿ business as usual￿ . The ￿rm￿ s returns
from business as usual are veri￿able and depend on manager￿ s type. Returns
are ￿ > 0 if the manager is high-ability, and are ￿ = 0 if the manager is low-
ability. Recalling that the manager is randomly chosen and that ￿ is the fraction
of high-ability managers, the expected return from routine activity is ￿￿. As
to investment projects, we assume that the ￿rm can select one among N ￿ 3
possible projects. However, only two projects are relevant: project 0 and project
1: These projects o⁄er a positive and veri￿able monetary return R > 0 with
probabilities p0 and p1 respectively, where p0 > p1 > 0: With complementary
probabilities the return is zero. To simplify matters we assume that project
return is independent of manager type. The remaining N ￿2 projects (indexed
from 2 to N ￿ 1) yield very negative returns with some probability so that
randomly picking a project results in a negative expected return. Project 1
o⁄ers private bene￿ts b > 0 to the manager implementing it. For technical
reasons we assume that b < ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿, that ￿(2 + ￿) < p1R < 2 ￿ ￿ and
that (p0 ￿ p1)R < ￿:3
2We could allow for d to be stochastic (0 ￿ d ￿ 1) but, as the large shareholder￿ s problem
would not be concave in d; the optimal solutions would still be corner ones. Thus, we simplify
the exposition by directly presenting the two cases of d = 0 and d = 1.
3These assumptions ensure interior solutions for e⁄ort, ownership structure, incentive pay
and monitoring thus simplifying the exposition. They also ensure that incentive compatibility
conditions on s and w are satis￿ed. Results would not be a⁄ected by also considering corner
7In order to identify project 0 and project 1, information must be gathered
by the manager. Gathering information requires unobservable e⁄ort e 2 [0;1]
at cost e
2
2 . A level of e⁄ort e implies that the manager is able to identify project
0 and 1 (and to distinguish between them) with probability e: With probability
1￿e; the manager does not obtain enough information and, given that random
choice is unpro￿table, no project is chosen. Thus e is the probability of under-
taking a risky project. If the manager is in charge of project choice, he will use
such information to choose his preferred project. If the large shareholder retains
control over project choice, the manager will have to pass the information to
her. We assume that the information is ￿ hard￿ meaning that the manager can
either withhold information or pass it on truthfully. Furthermore, we assume
that the large shareholder is able to correctly process the information obtained
from the manager.4
In period 3, once e⁄ort has been exerted and (possibly) a risky project has
been selected, the large shareholder can engage in monitoring. Monitoring is
aimed at assessing the manager￿ s type in order to decide whether to retain or to
￿re him. Recall that manager￿ s ability positively a⁄ects the returns from routine
activity so that replacing a low-ability manager with a high-ability one increases
such returns. However monitoring is costly and its outcome is uncertain. A
monitoring intensity M 2 [0;1] costs M2=2 to the large shareholder and allows
her to learn the manager￿ s ability with probability M. With probability 1￿M
the large shareholder remains uninformed. Monitoring is uncontractible, so that
there is no possibility to induce the large shareholder to increase monitoring
intensity through payments contingent on it. Following monitoring, the large
shareholder makes a report b t on the manager￿ s type. Then, on the basis of this
report and of the ￿ring rule PF(b t) speci￿ed in the contract, the manager is
either retained or ￿red. We assume that the managers￿pool is large enough for
the probability of a high ability replacement to remain ￿: We also assume that
there are no ￿ring costs other than the severance pay and that, in the event of
solutions or binding constraints.
4We assume that processing information as well as being in charge of project choice imposes
no costs on the large shareholder. Including such a cost would insert an additional motive for
delegation.
8￿ring, the new manager cannot modify the investment project.
In period 4, cash ￿ ows are realized and payments are made. If project
1 has been implemented and the incumbent manager has not been ￿red, the
latter obtains private bene￿ts b. In section 7 we extend the analysis to the case
where private bene￿ts are obtained before the possible ￿ring decision, so that
the incumbent manager always obtains b when project 1 is implemented.
Summarizing, timing is as follows:
period 1: The initial owner determines the optimal ownership structure, ￿





period 2: The manager implements e⁄ort e and possibly a new investment
project is chosen (by either the manager or the large shareholder).
period 3: The large shareholder exerts monitoring and learns manager￿ s type
with probability M: Then, she decides whether to retain or ￿re the manager.
period 4: Cash ￿ ows from routine activity and possibly from a risky project
are obtained, together with private bene￿ts if project 1 is selected. Payments
are made.
We proceed by backward induction, ￿nding ￿rst the optimal level of mon-
itoring. However, since managerial compensation and delegation structure are
determined only in Section 6, we anticipate in the next section their main char-
acteristics that are crucial in understanding the following analysis.
3 Managerial Compensation and Delegation
In order to elicit the optimal level of e⁄ort from the manager, the large share-
holder o⁄ers him an incentive contract. Manager￿ s compensation can be condi-
tioned on veri￿able returns and on the ￿ring decision, so that the manager may
receive severance pay if ￿red. Given that the manager has no possibility to im-
prove his (exogenously given) ability, and consequently cannot increase returns
from routine activity, there is no point in conditioning managerial compensa-
9tion on ￿. Performance pay, and possibly severance pay, conditional on return
R can instead be used to induce a greater e⁄ort from the manager. We then
consider compensations formed by a base salary, performance pay and severance
pay. Given that the reservation utility of the manager is normalized to zero and
that routine activity imposes no disutility on the manager, the base salary is
equal to zero. Moreover, since the manager is protected by limited liability, we
restrict our attention to compensation contracts that yield zero payment when
the project￿ s return is zero and a non-negative bonus when the project succeeds.
The bonus is w if the manager is retained, and s if he is ￿red. In other words,
also severance pay is contingent on project success. Recalling that in the event
of ￿ring the new manager cannot modify the investment project, no incentive
compensation is paid to the replacement.
Incentive compensation however is not su¢ cient to solve the con￿ ict of in-
terests between the manager and the large shareholder. Recall that project 1
o⁄ers private bene￿ts b > 0 to the manager implementing it. This, together
with the assumption that p0 > p1; creates a con￿ ict between the manager and
the large shareholder because, everything else being equal, the former prefers
project 1 and the latter, who is interested in monetary return, prefers project
0. Given that project choice in uncontractible, compensation cannot be con-
tingent on project choice. As a consequence the delegation structure d is key
to determining which project will be chosen. In case of delegation (d = 1), the
manager will choose project 1; and in case of no delegation (d = 0) the large
shareholder will choose project 0: Delegation can then be viewed as a commit-
ment device for the large shareholder to implement project 1 in an incomplete
contract environment.
4 Period 3: Monitoring and ￿ring decision
In period 3, once the manager has exerted e⁄ort and a project has possibly
been chosen, the large shareholder may ￿nd it optimal to monitor the manager
in order to learn his type. Depending on the reported type and on the ￿ring rule
10contained in the contract, the incumbent manager is then retained or replaced.
In the event of ￿ring, the ability of the replacement is unknown at the
time he is hired. If a low-ability manager is replaced, there is an increase in
expected returns from routine activity equal to ￿￿. If instead a high-ability
manager is replaced, there is an expected loss equal to (1 ￿ ￿)￿. The optimal
contract must then prescribe ￿ring (retention) if low (high) ability is observed,
i.e. PF(b L) = 1 and PF( b H) = 0: However, the decision of the large shareholder
also depends on the di⁄erence between incentive pay w and severance pay s.
In order to guarantee that the large shareholder has no incentive to misreport
the manager￿ s type given PF( b H) = 0 and PF(b L) = 1, w and s must satisfy the
following two incentive compatibility conditions:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ pi(w ￿ s) ￿ 0 (1)
￿￿ ￿ pi(s ￿ w) ￿ 0 (2)
with i = 0;1. The ￿rst condition guarantees that the gain in expected pro￿t from
retaining a high-ability manager, (1￿￿)￿, is not o⁄set by the di⁄erence between
expected bonus if he is retained and severance pay if he is ￿red, pi(w ￿ s):
Similarly, the second condition guarantees that the gain in ￿ring the low-ability
type, ￿￿; is not o⁄set by the di⁄erence pi(s ￿ w).
Consider now the optimal ￿ring probability when monitoring is unsuccessful.
If nothing is learnt from monitoring (which happens with probability 1 ￿ M),
there is no expected gain from replacing the manager because the expected pro￿t
from the incumbent is equal to the expected pro￿t from a replacement. As a
consequence the corresponding incentive compatible ￿ring probability, PF(b 0) ￿





= 1 if w > s
= 0 if w < s
2 [0;1] if w = s
(3)
The optimal values of w, s and PF will be determined in Section 6. For
the moment su¢ ce it to note that the values of w; s and PF contained in the
contract satisfy conditions (1), (2) and (3) respectively:
11Recalling that project 1 (project 0) is chosen under delegation (no delega-
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where Ipro 2 f0;1g is an indicator function taking value 1if a risky project has





￿￿ + Ipropd(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ PF
d )(wd ￿ sd)
￿￿
: (4)
Monitoring increases in the expected gain from replacing a bad with a good
manager, ￿￿; and in the fraction of shares owned by the large shareholder, ￿.
Given that PF must satisfy (3), the level of monitoring is the highest when a
risky project is not undertaken (Ipro = 0) or if a project is implemented with
w = s. In such cases, monitoring intensity simpli￿es to:
Md = ￿d(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ (5)
This high-lights one aspect of the con￿ ict between monitoring and incentives
for project choice. Whenever incentives for e⁄ort require to set w 6= s, the
level of monitoring must be reduced with respect to (5) to preserve incentive
compatibility in the ￿ring decision.
5 Period 2: Managerial e⁄ort
In period 2, the manager decides the level of e⁄ort that maximizes his expected
utility. If the large shareholder retains control rights on investment decision
(d = 0), the manager knows that project 0 will be chosen and that he will only
get monetary compensation. Under delegation (d = 1) instead he will be able
to choose project 1 obtaining also private bene￿ts b.
Recall that the manager does not know his own type when deciding the level
of e. However, he can anticipate the value of Md that will be chosen by the
12large shareholder in order to calculate the ex ante ￿ring probability in case a




d ); d = 0;1: (6)
The manager then solves:
max




>From the ￿rst order condition we obtain :
e0 = p0 [w0(1 ￿ F0) + s0F0] (7)
and
e1 = p1 [w1(1 ￿ F1) + s1F1] + b(1 ￿ F1) (8)
Managerial e⁄ort is an increasing function of the expected value of monetary
compensation and, in the case of delegation, of private bene￿ts. As far as
monetary compensation is concerned, the expectation is taken with respect to
the probability of success conditional on project choice. For a given value of d,
when the project succeeds, the bonus is w if the manager is con￿rmed (which
happens with probability 1 ￿ F). If the manager is ￿red (which happens with
probability F) he gets severance pay s. Private bene￿ts instead are obtained
only under delegation and if the manager remains with the ￿rm.
Monetary compensation and private bene￿ts are substitutes with respect
to managerial e⁄ort. As a consequence the large shareholder will choose the
combination of w, s, and d that makes it cheaper to motivate the manager.
6 Period 1: Large Shareholder maximization prob-
lem
The objective of the large shareholder in period 1 is to maximize the equity
value of the ￿rm net of monitoring costs, i.e. the sum that she could raise by
selling all the shares to dispersed shareholders. The large shareholder decides





13o⁄ers to the manager, anticipating how the subsequent choice of e⁄ort by the
manager, ed, and her own choice of monitoring intensity Md are in￿ uenced by
these variables.
>From Section 4 we know that PF( b H) = 0 and PF(b L) = 1 independently
of the delegation structure, so that we are left with the determination of ￿, w;s;
PF and d: Since d is a discrete variable that can take only two values we solve
the maximization problem of the large shareholder with respect to ￿, PF; w and
s for each value of d. Then, by comparing ￿rm equity value with and without
delegation, we determine the optimal d.
Using (4) for the value of Md, the large shareholder solves the following
maximization problem for d = 0;1:
Max
￿;w;s;P F edpd[R ￿ w(1 ￿ Fd) ￿ sFd] + ￿￿ + (9)
edf￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿[(1 ￿ ￿)
￿















where e0 is determined in (7), e1 in (8); w ￿ s and PF must satisfy (1); (2 ),
(3).
The solution of the problem is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When the large shareholder retains control over project choice
(d = 0); she optimally sets w0 = s0 = R
2 and PF
0 2 [0;1]: When she decides








4p1 ; s1 = w1 + b
(1￿￿)p1 and PF
1 = 0: Both under
d = 0 and d = 1 she retains full ownership of the ￿rm ￿0=￿1= 1
Proof. See Appendix.
When the large shareholder ￿nds it optimal to keep control over project
choice (d = 0 ), returns from the project are equally shared between the man-
ager and the large shareholder by setting the bonus equal to R
2 irrespective of
the ￿ring decision. As a consequence, the ￿ring probability becomes irrelevant,
14PF
0 2 [0;1], and we can assume without loss of generality that the ￿ring rule
inserted in the contract prescribes either PF
0 = 0 or PF
0 = 1: When the large
shareholder delegates project choice to the manager (d = 1); monetary com-
pensation is lower because the manager has positive expected private bene￿ts.
Note that in this case the level of the severance payment exceeds the level of the
incentive pay: s1 > w1. Now PF
1 must be equal to 0 in order for the contract
to be incentive compatible: If PF
1 were positive, the large shareholder would in
fact have an incentive to report high ability even when she has no information.
Both under delegation and no delegation, the large shareholder retains full own-
ership of the ￿rm, which enables her to maximize monitoring intensity. However
the realized level of monitoring depends on the delegation structure. By using
Proposition 1 and substituting the values of w; s; PF and ￿ in expression (4)
we obtain:
M0 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
M1 = (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿ ￿ b]
which, once substituted into (6); result in a lower level of the ex ante ￿ring
probability under delegation than under the authority of the large shareholder
F0 = M0(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ M0)PF
0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)M0 > (1 ￿ ￿)M1 = F1
Monitoring intensity is highest when the large shareholder retains authority
over project choice (d = 0).5 When instead project choice is delegated to the
manager (d = 1), monitoring is reduced to decrease the ex ante ￿ring probability
F1, and to increase the expected value of private bene￿ts, (1 ￿ F1)b. The ex
ante ￿ring probability is optimally reduced to motivate the manager to exert
e⁄ort since private bene￿ts represent an incentive component obtainable only if
the manager stays with the ￿rm. In other words, when d = 1 there is a trade-o⁄
between routine pro￿ts that are increasing in monitoring and pro￿ts from the
risky project that require a low monitoring. When d = 0 instead, there is no
point in distorting monitoring because monetary compensation is independent
5In this case the ex ante ￿ring probability depends on the chosen value of PF
0 . Given
w0 = s0 when monitoring is unsuccessful the large shareholder is indi⁄erent between retaining
or ￿ring the incumbent manager.
15of the ￿ring policy: w0 = s0 and the manager receives no private bene￿ts. These
results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When project choice is delegated to the manager, monitoring
and the resulting ex ante ￿ring probability are optimally reduced to provide the
manager with the proper incentive to exert e⁄ort.
It is worth noting the role of severance pay in this incentive con￿ ict. Sev-
erance pay, by providing a payment s1 > w1, insulates the manager from the
replacement policy, compensating him for the loss of private bene￿ts. In fact
when private bene￿ts are unobtainable (d = 0); incentive pay and severance
pay are equal. A severance payment higher than incentive pay introduces a
distortion in the level of monitoring, and consequently in the ￿ring probability
which is reduced with respect to the case of no delegation. Notice that in the
absence of severance pay, the only means to motivate the manager would be
to reduce the ￿ring probability. Other papers have shown that some degree of
entrenchment may be optimal because the ￿ring threat may lead to suboptimal
managerial behavior.6 In our paper, severance pay is important for the opposite
reason: it allows the large shareholder to motivate the manager without distort-
ing the ￿ring policy too much. To a certain extent, in our model severance pay
is a substitute for a more accommodating ￿ring policy.
High severance pay contracted at the time the manager is hired and con-
tingent on project return that realizes after the manager￿ s departure may look
unrealistic. However, these characteristics of the optimal severance payment
are consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Yermack (2006) and by
Rusticus (2006). Rusticus analyzes a sample of newly hired CEOs from S&P
1500 and ￿nds that half of the CEOs in his sample have some form of severance
agreements when they take o¢ ce. Yermack, in a study of separation pay for
retired and dismissed CEO, con￿rms that severance agreements contracted at
the time the manager is hired are common and shows that, in the event of ￿ring,
it is a common practice to grant the CEO a discretionary separation pay in ad-
6For example Almazan and Suarez (2003) have demonstrated that shareholders may gain by
relinquishing some power in favour of the CEO. In their model, severance pay is an important
instrument to this end because it reduces the probability of ￿ring the manager.
16dition to the contracted separation pay. Discretionary separation pay includes
several items: cash payments and new awards of stock or options, consulting and
non-compete agreements that will be paid over a number of years, adjustments
to bene￿t pensions and adjustment to equity compensation. All these discre-
tionary components a⁄ect CEOs wealth for several years after CEO departure
and it seems reasonable to consider that, for example, the payments received as
a consultant or the non-compete agreements are contingent on project success.
Having characterized the optimal contract with and without delegation, we
now have to determine if and when delegating project choice is pro￿table: First
of all, by substituting condition (22) from the proof of Proposition 1 and ￿ = 1
in the net equity value of the ￿rm (see the objective of the large shareholder)
we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The net equity values of the ￿rm without and with delegation can
be expressed as:
V0 = (e0)









where e0 = p0
R
2 and e1 = p1
R
2 + b





This tells us that delegation is optimal if and only if the e⁄ort level obtained
when d = 1 is higher than the e⁄ort level obtained when d = 0. By comparing
e0 with e1 we can then establish conditions for delegation to be pro￿table.
Proposition 3. There exists a threshold value b such that for b > b the large
shareholder prefers to delegate project choice (d = 1) and for b < b she prefers
to keep control over it (d = 0). b is increasing in R and in the di⁄erence p0￿p1
so that high values of both make delegation less likely.
Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 3 establishes a positive relationship between delegation and the
level of private bene￿ts. For su¢ ciently high level of b, project choice is dele-
gated to the manager. In this case (see Proposition 1), monetary compensation
17is reduced in proportion to the level of expected private bene￿ts. For low levels
of b instead, the large shareholder ￿nds it more pro￿table to keep control over
project choice because the reduction in the expected return from the project un-
der delegation (recall that the manager chooses project 1) is not compensated
by the reduction in monetary compensation. In other words, the higher is b; the
more pro￿table it is to substitute private bene￿ts for monetary compensation
in order to motivate the manager.7 Given that p0 > p1, the threshold value b
is increasing in R because so is the di⁄erence in expected returns from project
0 and 1. Obviously such di⁄erence is ampli￿ed by an increase in the di⁄erence
p0 ￿ p1; for any given R.
7 Extensions
In this section we present three extensions of the basic model. In the ￿rst one,
we further explore the relationship between delegation, ownership and compen-
sation policy by studying the limit case with no monetary compensation, i.e.
with w = s = 0. In the second one, we examine a di⁄erent timing that allows
the manager to enjoy private bene￿ts before the ￿ring/retention decision. This
modi￿ed timing eliminates the negative impact of monitoring on managerial
e⁄ort. The third extension maintains this modi￿ed timing and exacerbates the
con￿ ict of interests between manager and large shareholder by allowing project
0 to yield private bene￿ts to the large shareholder in addition to the higher
return. This of course makes delegation less likely.
A. No monetary incentives
There may be situations in which monetary incentives cannot be paid because,
for example, monetary return R is not veri￿able. In the basic model, monetary
compensation and delegation are alternative methods of providing incentives. If
we rule out monetary incentives, delegation is the only way to induce managerial
e⁄ort and this obviously reinforces the optimality of delegation. It immediately
7Notice that for b = 0 the large shareholder is indi⁄erent between d = 0 and d = 1 because
the con￿ict of interests disappears. Even the manager now prefers to choose project 0 that
has a higher probability of success.
18follows from (7) that in the absence of monetary incentives, managerial e⁄ort is
equal to zero when d = 0, and is equal to
e1jw=s=0 = b(1 ￿ F1jw=s=0) (13)
when d = 1: Private bene￿ts become now necessary for the manager to exert
e⁄ort and consequently for a risky project to be chosen. Then the following
proposition holds.8
Proposition 4. If no monetary compensation is available, i.e. if w = s = 0,
the threshold value is bw=s=0 = 0, so that the large shareholder always chooses
to delegate the manager (d = 1) when private bene￿ts are strictly positive. The
fraction of retained shares is strictly smaller than one, (￿1jw=s=0 = 1 ￿
bRp1
￿￿ )




Whenever b > 0 the large shareholder chooses delegation in order to have a
positive probability of undertaking the risky project. The fraction of retained
shares ￿1jw=s=0 is now lower than 1: The reason is that, once we exclude mon-
etary compensation, the only way to reduce M1 is to decrease the value of ￿:
If ￿1 were equal to 1, monitoring intensity, and consequently the ex ante ￿ring
probability F1; would be too high from an incentive point of view because a
high level of F1 implies a relatively low level of e⁄ort (see (13)).
If b = 0, the large shareholder is indi⁄erent as to the delegation structure
because no risky project will be undertaken. In this case, she also retain full
ownership of the ￿rm in order to maximize monitoring and consequently pro￿ts
from routine activity.
Given that ￿1jw=s=0 < 1; a time consistency problem may arise. Once the
manager has exerted e⁄ort and information on investment projects has been
gathered, the large shareholder may have an incentive to buy back some shares
thus increasing her stake. This would prompt an increase in monitoring intensity
8In the absence of monetary compensation, the condition 1 > Rp1 must be added to the
other assumptions in order to ensure a positive level of ￿.
19that would increase expected returns from routine activity without having nega-
tive e⁄ects on the (sunk) level of e⁄ort. The manager however, would anticipate
the behavior of the large shareholder and would lower the e⁄ort level accord-
ingly. In other words, the optimal contract illustrated in the above proposition
would be destroyed. Fortunately it can be proved that the large shareholder
has no incentive to retrade after date 1, provided that her stake is publicly
observable.9 In order to induce dispersed shareholders to sell their shares, the
large shareholder has to o⁄er a price that fully re￿ ects the increase in the equity
value of the ￿rm. But if this is the case, she cannot gain by purchasing back
the shares.
B. Manager￿ s private bene￿ts independent of monitoring
There may be cases where the manager has no need to stay for a long time
with the ￿rm in order to enjoy private bene￿ts. For example, the bene￿ts may
consist of the increased visibility obtained by the announcement of the new
project undertaken by the ￿rm. The case where the ￿ring/retention decision is
taken after the manager has enjoyed private bene￿ts can be represented by a
change in the timing considered so far, such that in period 3 private bene￿ts
(if any) from the risky project are realized; in period 4 the large shareholder
implements monitoring and decides whether to con￿rm or ￿re the manager; and
￿nally in period 5, routine and project￿ s returns are realized.
When the large shareholder retains control over choice and selects project
0, no private bene￿ts are generated. As a consequence, for d = 0, monitoring,
e⁄ort and the contract o⁄ered by the large shareholder are the same as those
analyzed in the basic model of Section 6. Under delegation, instead, e⁄ort choice
is modi￿ed because b is now obtained with certainty when project 1 is selected.
It can be easily veri￿ed that e⁄ort becomes
e e1 = p1[e w1(1 ￿ F1) + e s1F1] + b:
Then, the following proposition holds.
9The proof is omitted because it parallels the argument provided in Proposition 4 by
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) to prove that the large shareholder does not have an
incentive to renegatiate her e⁄ort.
20Proposition 5. If the manager is able to enjoy private bene￿ts before the
￿ring/retention decision, the large shareholder optimally sets e w0 = e s0 = R=2
when she retains control over project choice (d = 0); and e w1 = e s1 = R
2 ￿ b
2p1
when she delegates project choice (d = 1). The optimal value of ￿ is independent
of d and is always equal to 1 and e PF 2 [0;1]:
Proof: See Appendix.
If the manager is able to enjoy private bene￿ts before the ￿ring/retention
decision, the incentive provided by delegation is stronger than in the basic model
and this makes it cheaper to induce him to exert e⁄ort when d = 1: In this case,
incentive pay is lower than in the basic model, e w1 < w1: Moreover, e s1 = e w1
because, in the event of ￿ring, there is no need to compensate the manager
for the loss of private bene￿ts. Equality between incentive and severance pay
implies that monitoring is independent of delegation. It then reaches the same
level as in the basic model without delegation: f M1 = f M0 = M0: This in turn
means that, under delegation, monitoring intensity is now higher: f M1 > M1:
In the basic model, the ￿ring decision (which positively depends on monitoring
intensity) a⁄ects managerial choice of e⁄ort because it reduces the probability
of enjoying private bene￿ts. To contrast this e⁄ect, the large shareholder opti-
mally chooses to increase severance pay above the level of w1 in order to reduce
monitoring intensity and the ex ante ￿ring probability. When the link between
managerial incentive and monitoring is receded as in the present case, there is
no need to reduce monitoring and the bonus paid if the project is successful
does not depend on the ￿ring decision, i.e. e s1 = e w1. This result is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If the manager is able to enjoy private bene￿ts before the
￿ring/retention decision, delegation implies no tension between monitoring and
managerial incentive to exert e⁄ort.
Considering that e e1 = p1R + b
2; we immediately see that e⁄ort under del-
egation is now higher than in the basic model. This implies that delegation
becomes optimal for lower values of b as shown by the following proposition.
21Proposition 7. If private bene￿ts are enjoyable before the ￿ring/retention
decision, there exists a threshold value e b such that for b > e b the large shareholder
prefers to delegate project choice (d = 1) and for b < e b she prefers to keep control
over it (d = 0). e b is increasing in R, p0, and decreasing in p1. Moreover e b < b:
Proof: See Appendix.
C. Large Shareholder Private Bene￿ts
Suppose now that incongruence over projects is exacerbated by the presence of
private bene￿ts for the large shareholder associated with project 0; where B
denotes these bene￿ts. The expressions for monitoring and managerial e⁄ort
are not a⁄ected by large shareholder￿ s private bene￿ts. Also the maximization
problem under delegation is the same as in subsection B above. However, for
d = 0 the large shareholder￿ s problem becomes:
Max
￿;w;s;P F b e0[(R ￿ w(1 ￿ b F0) ￿ sb F0)p0 + B] + ￿￿ +
b e0f￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿[(1 ￿ ￿)
￿















The solutions for ￿ and w, s; and PF lead to the following results.10
Proposition 8. If private bene￿ts for the large shareholder are associated
with project 0 and the manager is able to enjoy private bene￿ts before the ￿r-
ing/retention decision, the optimal value of ￿ is independent of d and always
equal to 1 and b PF 2 [0;1]. Incentive compensation is equal to b w0 = b s0 = R
2 + B
2p0
when d = 0 and to b w1 = b s1 = R
2 ￿ b
2p1 = e w1 when d = 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
When d = 0 the monetary compensation paid to the agent is now higher
because the payo⁄ that the large shareholder obtains from managerial e⁄ort is
higher. Under delegation instead (d = 1) the solutions for w;s and ￿ are the
same as in the absence of B. However, the expected loss from implementing
10In order to ensure an interior solution for e0 we now assume p0R + B < 2:
22project 1 instead of project 0 is now higher and consequently, as shown in the
next proposition, the large shareholder is more reluctant to delegate project
choice. The next proposition shows that we may never have delegation if B is
large relatively to b.
Proposition 9. The large shareholder delegates project choice if and only
managerial private bene￿ts b are su¢ ciently higher than her own private bene￿ts
B i.e. i⁄ b ￿ B > (p0 ￿ p1)R:
Proof: see Appendix.
Delegation is now chosen only when managerial private bene￿ts are higher
than the sum of the large shareholder￿ s private bene￿ts plus the expected loss
in returns from choosing project 1 instead of project 0.
8 Discussion
We have analyzed the optimal delegation, ownership structure, and compensa-
tion scheme in a setting where a large shareholder has two tasks: monitoring the
manager to assess his ability and supervising the choice of a risky project. The
e⁄ort of the manager is needed to gather information on projects but preferences
over projects are dissonant because of managerial private bene￿ts. An incentive
con￿ ict for the large shareholder then arises because a large ownership stake
is optimal for the ￿rst task (monitoring) while a small stake is called for the
second task (supervising project choice without reducing managerial incentive).
The key insight of the paper is that such con￿ ict can be solved by delegating
project choice to the manager. This in turn allows the large shareholder to
retain full ownership of the ￿rm. However, full ownership comes at the price
of distorting monitoring and the resulting ￿ring policy. Delegation is optimal
when private bene￿ts are relatively large because the prospect of enjoying such
bene￿ts motivates the manager.
Ownership structure, delegation and monitoring are determined together
taking into account their interdependence. Monitoring (which is an increasing
23function of the large shareholder￿ s fraction of shares) positively a⁄ects the ex
ante ￿ring probability because it helps identifying a low-ability manager. How-
ever, a higher ￿ring probability reduces managerial incentives provided by pri-
vate bene￿ts. Then, under delegation, the optimal incentive scheme prescribes
a lower level of monitoring and of the ￿ring probability. This is accomplished
by increasing severance pay with respect to incentive pay. Thus, our model con-
tributes to the literature that shows that some managerial entrenchment may be
optimal from the shareholders￿point of view (see Almazan and Suarez (2003)
and Inderst and Muller (2008) ) and o⁄ers a rationale for a potentially high
severance pay even when the manager is low-ability11. Indeed, high severance
pay for the low-ability manager results from optimal contracting and not from
rent extraction.
A few testable implications can be derived from our basic model. The model
predicts that when the manager has discretionary power (delegation) we should
observe a lower turnover, longer tenure, higher severance pay and lower incentive
pay than when he has no such a power. Furthermore, the severance package
should apply only to CEO dismissals and not to voluntary retirements. Finally,
the model predicts that delegation (i.e. manager discretionary power) should
be more likely the smaller the di⁄erence in projects￿expected return and the
more pro￿table it is to motivate the manager with private bene￿ts rather than
with monetary compensation.
A number of extensions are also analyzed. First, if no monetary incentive
is available, delegation is always optimal because private bene￿ts are the only
means to motivate the manager. Given that severance pay can no longer be used
to reduce the large shareholder￿ s incentive for monitoring, now the fraction of
shares retained by the large shareholder is smaller than one. Second, we analyze
a di⁄erent timing in which private bene￿ts are obtained independently of mon-
itoring (i.e. before the possible ￿ring decision). In this case monitoring has no
negative e⁄ects on incentives, its intensity is higher than in the basic model and
this makes delegation optimal in a larger number of cases. Finally, we consider
11Also Manso (2008) stresses the importance of rewarding failures to incentive the manager.
24large shareholder￿ s private bene￿ts assuming that these are associated with the
most pro￿table among the risky projects. In this case, delegation implies a
higher forgone return for the large shareholder and consequently becomes less
likely.
Provided that delegation is optimal in a number of cases, the question arises
of how the large shareholder can credibly commit to delegate project choice. In
other words the problem is how to make the choice of d = 1 (when speci￿ed in
the contract), enforceable. We believe that an appropriate dual board structure
may be an e⁄ective commitment to delegate project choice to the management.
Consider a two-tier structure composed by a supervisory board and a manage-
ment board with the following features. The positions on the two boards are
mutually exclusive so that the same person cannot sit on both boards. The
management board is mainly composed of managers with executive functions
whose objectives do not con￿ ict with the objective of the CEO.12 The large
shareholder instead sits on the supervisory board that is mainly composed of
members whose objectives are aligned with hers. The supervisory board is in
charge of monitoring and of making the ￿ring/retention decision while the man-
agement board is in charge of project selection. The choice of such a dual board
structure then allows the large shareholder not to interfere with managerial
decision without losing control of the ￿ring/retention decision.
This interpretation leads to interesting policy implications for those areas,
such as Continental Europe, where concentrated ownership is still the norm.
Faccio and Lang (2002), for example, report that family ownership is predom-
inant in 11 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In some of these coun-
tries, i.e. Germany, Austria, Belgium, the dual structure is mandatory, in other
countries like France and Italy, companies can choose between di⁄erent board
models. Our result does not suggest that existing two-tier boards represent the
12This is usually the case for inside members whose career and salary depend on CEO￿ s
decisions. Moreover, executive directors may also share some of the CEO￿ s private bene￿ts.
For example, if the CEO expands the ￿rm beyond its optimal size for personal prestige and
power motives, all members of the management board bene￿t from the increased visibility of
a larger ￿rm. In other words, the preferences of the executive directors are usually aligned
with those of the CEO.
25optimal corporate governance solution but it indicates that a speci￿c two-tier
structure may be the optimal choice for companies under family control. Al-
though limiting the activism of large shareholders can be a challenging task, it is
more di¢ cult for large shareholders to overrule or to interfere with management
board decisions when the functions of the two boards are separated and clearly
de￿ned by corporate charters. Thus, we believe that a two-tier board structure
may be a valuable option in Continental Europe as well as in other areas where
ownership of ￿rms (including that of large corporations) is concentrated and
founding families are often ￿ too active￿in ￿rm management.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Note that the maximization problem (9) can be written as:
Max





s.t. (7), (8), (3), (1), (2) and where
Ad ￿ pd[R ￿ w(1 ￿ Fi) ￿ sFd] (17)
and
Zd ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)2￿dpd(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ PF
d )(wd ￿ sd) ￿ (18)
(1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
dp2
d(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ PF
d )2(wd ￿ sd)2
2
￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
dpd(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ PF
d )(wd ￿ sd):
We ignore for the moment (1), (2): Once the solutions for w and s are derived,
it will be clear that they are satis￿ed. The other constraints are substituted in
the objective function.
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￿￿ + Ipropd(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ PF
d )(wd ￿ sd)
￿￿
:
Summing up (19) and (20) and substituting for the derivatives from the above
expressions we obtain:
Ad + Zd = ed (22)
Substituting (22) into (19) and taking the derivatives we have:
db(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ PF) = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ Md with Ipro = 1: (23)
Considering that PF must satisfy (3) and that ￿ must not exceed unity, i) for
d = 0 condition (23) can be satis￿ed i⁄ w = s and ￿ = 1, and ii) for d = 1 it
cannot be satis￿ed if w > s.




In order to fully characterize the case of d = 1; let us ￿rst substitute (22)
into (21): Using (3); after some manipulation we have that, for w ￿ s; (21) can
then be written as:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
2￿2(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ e1) = 0:
29Considering that e1 < 1; this implies ￿ = 1. Given ￿ = 1; (23) in turn implies:










b + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿￿)
2p1
+
b2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + 3￿)
4p1
:
Finally it can be easily veri￿ed that PF
0 2 [0;1]:
10.2 Proof of Proposition 3
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> 0;
e1 however is increasing in b ranging from e1jb=0 = p1
R
2 when b = 0 to a level






2 ) when b ! ￿ ￿ (1￿￿)￿￿: When
b ! ￿ we then have e1jb!￿ > e0 so that the ￿rst part of Proposition 3 is implied.
Given that the di⁄erence between e1 and e0 is clearly increasing in (p0 ￿ p1) R
2
the second part of the proposition immediately follows.
10.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The ￿rst part of the proposition immediately follows from e0jw=s=0 = 0. The
values of ￿1jw=s=0 and PF
1jw=s=0 are derived from the ￿rst-order conditions of
the large shareholder￿ s optimization problem that now take the form:
￿ : ￿b(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ PF)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿p1R + ￿
2￿2(1 ￿ ￿)2 (1 ￿ ￿) = 0
PF : p1Rb(￿1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿) < 0
implying PF
1jw=s=0 = 0 and ￿1jw=s=0 = 1 ￿
bRp1
￿￿ .
3010.4 Proof of Proposition 5
The maximization problem of the large shareholder is the same as that analyzed
in the proof of Proposition 1, with the only di⁄erence that for d = 1 managerial
e⁄ort is given by:




= p1 (1 ￿ F1) ￿ (w ￿ s)
@F1
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Then, if we proceed as in the proof of Proposition 1 and we substitute Ai+Zi =






[￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿p1(e w1 ￿ e s1)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ PF)] = 0:
Considering that PF must satisfy (3) and that ￿ must not exceed unity, this
expression implies
e w1 ￿ e s1 = 0 and ￿ = 1:
Given e w1 = e s1 any value of PF
1 2 [0;1] satis￿es the FOCs. Using A + Z = e e1;
which simpli￿es to A = e e1 when w = s; we obtain:







10.5 Proof of Proposition 7
This proof follows the same line of reasoning used in the proof of Proposition
3. Also in this case the equity value is larger under delegation if and only if
managerial e⁄ort is larger: i.e., e V1 > e V0 i⁄ e e1 > e e0 = e0. Given that e0 =
Rp0
2
31and e e1 =
Rp1
2 + b
2 clearly e e1 < e e0 when b = 0: It is immediate to see that e e1
is increasing in b. When b ! ￿; e e1 > e e0 because ￿ > R(p0 ￿ p1). Given that
the di⁄erence between e e1 and e e0 is clearly increasing in (p0 ￿ p1) R
2 , the second
part of the proposition immediately follows. e b < b follows from e e1 > e1 when
b > 0:
10.6 Proof of Proposition 8
The results for d = 1 are those derived in Proposition 5. When d = 0 we can
replicate the same procedure used in the proof of Proposition 1 considering that
now in the expression for A we also have the constant B:
b A ￿ fp0[R ￿ w0 (1 ￿ F0) ￿ s0F0] + Bg:
As a consequence, after having veri￿ed that w = s; we set b A = b e0 and we obtain:







10.7 Proof of Proposition 9
This proof follows the same line of reasoning used in the Proof of Proposition 3
and 7. Again, the equity value is larger under delegation if and only if managerial















b ￿ B > (p0 ￿ p1)R:
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